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Abstract  
,Q WKLV DUWLFOH , VHHN WR FRQVWUXFWLYHO\ HQJDJH $OH[ $QLHYDV¶V VHPLQDO book that is 
deservedly the subject of this forum. For Anievas has become a key figure in the revival 
of Trotskyism in IR and his is one of the first book-length treatments of the New 
Trotskyist theory of the international. My critique is meant merely as a constructive effort 
to push his excellent scholarship further in terms of developing his non-Eurocentric 
approach. In the first section I argue that his book represents a giant leap forward for the 
New Trotskyist IR. However, in the following sections I argue that although undeniably a 
brave attempt nevertheless, in the last instance, Anievas falls a few steps short in realising 
a genuinely non-Eurocentric account of world politics. This is because while he certainly 
UHVWRUHV RU EULQJV LQ µWKH ORVW WKHRU\ DQG KLVWRU\ RI ,5¶ WKDW HOHYDWHV FODVV IRUFHV WR D
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FHQWUDO UROH LQ VKDSLQJ ZRUOG SROLWLFV QHYHUWKHOHVV KH IDLOV WR EULQJ LQ µWKH ORVW global 
WKHRU\DQGKLVWRU\RI(DVWHUQDJHQF\¶WKDWFRQVWLWXWHVLQP\YLHZWKHNH\LQJUHGLHQWRID
non-Eurocentric approach to world politics. I also argue that while his anti-reductionist 
ontological credentials are for the most part extremely impressive, nevertheless, I argue 
WKDWWKHVHDUHFRPSURPLVHGLQKLVDQDO\VLVRI+LWOHU¶VUDFLVP)LQDOO\LQWKHFRQFOXVLRQ,
ask whether the theoretical architecture of the New Trotskyism in IR is capable of 
developing a non-Eurocentric approach before concluding in the affirmative with respect 
to its modern revisionist incarnation of which Anievas is in the vanguard.  
 
Keywords: Eurocentrism, Eastern Agency, neo-Trotskyism, Uneven and Combined 
Development, 
 
 
Introduction 
In recent years the theory of uneven and combined development (U&CD) advanced by 
the New Trotskyism in IR (NTIR) has emerged as a serious contender for the theoretical 
hegemony that Gramscianism has held within the Marxist IR canon since the 1990s.1 
Importantly, Alex Anievas¶VCapital, the State and War constitutes one of the first single-
authored book-length treatments of NTIR, which in itself makes it worthy of 
consideration. But the fact that the book breaks new ground makes it a compelling piece 
of work and a highly accomplished contribution to IR scholarship for a whole host of 
reasons, many of which I do not have the space to discuss.  
 My primary interest in AnieYDV¶ ERRN OLHV in his contribution to the non-
Eurocentric stream of NTIR with which I have a direct interest. But it is necessary for me 
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to specify why I have chosen this focus beyond the point that this is where my own 
intellectual interests lie. For I am only too well aware of the dangers of reviewing 
VRPHRQHHOVH¶VERRNZKHUHLQWKHUHYLHZHUFKDVWLVHVUDWKHULPPRGHVWO\WKHDXWKRUIRUQRW
writing the book that the former would ideally like. This danger is important to note in 
this particular context, for Anievas admits candidly in the Conclusion chapter that while 
µVRPH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI UDFLVP DQG LGHRORJ\ KDV EHHQ RIIHUHG LQ WKLV ZRUN WKH OLQNDJHV
between culture, agency and identity in the nexus of North-South imperial relations 
feeding into the geopoliticVRIWKHHUDLVLQQHHGRIPXFKIXUWKHUDWWHQWLRQ¶
That said, though, this statement exists in tension with the many non-Eurocentric cues 
IRXQGLQWKHERRNDQGZLWK$QLHYDV¶VGHVLUHWREULQJLQYDULRXVµnon-Western vectors¶ ± 
particularly the North-South and the Transatlantic. Moreover, given that his most recent 
interests lie in constructing a non-Eurocentric NTIR theory of the rise of European 
capitalism (Anievas and 1LúDQFLR÷OX $QLHYDVDQG1LúDQFLR÷OX 2015), so I feel it 
legitimate to interrogate the issue of non-Eurocentrism in the book under review here.  
 ,QHVVHQFHRQHRIWKHSUREOHPV,KDYHLVWKDWWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHµ1RUWK-South 
YHFWRU¶ ZLWK WKH µ:HVW-(DVW YHFWRU¶ WXUQV RXW WR EH KLJKO\ XQHYHQ ZLWKLQ WKLV ERRN
Strangely while this is inserted into the case study of WWI, nevertheless, the North-South 
vector drops out of the two chapters on the origins of WWII. So we receive mixed 
messages concerning the precise scope of the spatial terrain that Anievas seeks to recover 
in what KH WHUPV WKH µORVW KLVWRU\ DQG WKHRU\ RI ,5¶ %XW WKLV LV DQ DQRPDO\ WKDW RQO\
partially concerns me. Much more importantly, while Anievas produces all manner of 
important and exciting cues for a non-Eurocentric approach, nevertheless, in the last 
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 See especially the contributions in Anievas (2010). 
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instance I feel that he fails to fully deliver on them. I take no joy in making this claim 
given that Anievas is clearly sympathetic to such an intellectual cause; and not least 
because I believe that Eurocentric or otherwise, this is simply a superb book, as I shall 
explain shortly. Accordingly, my criticisms are offered only as a constructive means of 
µKHOSLQJ¶KLPLQKLVFXUUHQWSURMHFWRIGHYHORSLQJQRQ-Eurocentric theory. 
 Perhaps it might be conjectured that the present book, which is a revision of his 
PhD tKHVLVRFFXSLHVDOLPLQDOWUDQVLWLRQDOMXQFWXUHLQ$QLHYDV¶VRZQWKLQNLQJFRQFHUQLQJ
the shift from a Eurocentric Marxist approach to a non-Eurocentric Marxism. For I am 
guessing that when he began the PhD his prime objective was to advance NTIR but that 
somewhere along the line he began to convert to the cause of non-Eurocentrism, by 
which time it was rather too late to integrate this properly within the present book. I 
VXVSHFWWKLVWREHWKHFDVHQRWOHDVWEHFDXVH,DPSURXGWRVD\,ZDV$QLHYDV¶VH[WHUnal 
examiner of his excellent PhD thesis. And having been so impressed by his thesis, I hope 
I can be forgiven for providing a sympathetic critique of his book ± even if he might not 
always perceive it as such!  
 The article is divided into four sections, the first of which highlights some of the 
many strengths of the book. Section two finds that his break with Eurocentrism in the 
discussion of WWI is incomplete given that while East-West interactions are discussed 
nevertheless Western agency remains the locus of attention such that Eastern agency fails 
WR UHJLVWHU RQ $QLHYDV¶ FDXVDO UDGDU VFUHHQ 7KH WKLUG VHFWLRQ FRQVLGHUV $QLHYDV¶V
discussion of the inter-war years and seeks to recover the lost story of Eastern agency 
while the fourth section interrogates his analysis of Woodrow Wilson and Adolf Hitler. 
7KHUH , DUJXH WKDW ZKLOH KH LV FHUWDLQO\ VHQVLWLYH WR :LOVRQ¶V UDFLVP QHYHUWKHOHVV KLV
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GLVFXVVLRQRI+LWOHU¶V UDFLVP LVSUREOHPDWLF in various ways including the point that in 
this instance he offends his otherwise excellent non-reductionist ontological credentials. 
Finally, in the conclusion I consider whether NTIR can constitute the basis for a non-
(XURFHQWULFWKHRU\RIZRUOGSROLWLFVJLYHQWKDWZKLOH7URWVN\¶VZRUNSURYLGHVDOOPDQQHU
of non-Eurocentric cues he failed to properly deliver on them. I conclude that neo-
7URWVN\LVPFDQLQGHHGUHDOLVHVXFKDSURPLVHDQGWKDW$QLHYDV¶Vlatest book does indeed 
deliver such a non-Eurocentric approach. 
 
 
2QH*LDQW/HDSIRU0DU[LVW,5WKHRU\« 
Given my claim that Anievas falls short of fully breaking with Eurocentrism the reader of 
this piece might very well assume that this article is primed as a wrecking operation. If so 
then (s)he would be sorely mistaken. I believe that this is a truly outstanding book and I 
find much of it to be plausible. First and foremost, the book constitutes a giant leap 
IRUZDUGIRUWKHFDXVHRIWKHµ17,5LQIDQW¶,WLVVLWXDWHGKHUHEHFDXVHWRFRLQWKHSKUDVH
RIRQHRIWKHLQIDQWVFKRRO¶VJRGIDWKHUV-XVWLQ5RVHQEHUJLWGHYHORSs and 
DSSOLHVDµVRFLDOWKHRU\RIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶WRWKHELJWHVWFDVHRI,5± that of the causes 
of war in general and those of the first and second world wars more specifically. This is 
obviously a huge terrain that Anievas explores, and most deftly does he engage it. Of 
perhaps principal import is the way in which Anievas brings to life the interplay of 
domestic social forces and international economic-cum-military pressures. This is 
HVSHFLDOO\ UHOHYDQW JLYHQ WKDW WKH SULQFLSDO GDQJHU RI WKH µVRFLDO Wheory of the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO¶WKDW5RVHQEHUJDQGRWKHUVDUHLQVHDUFKRIOLHVZLWKWKHSRWHQWLDORPLVVLRQ
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RI GRPHVWLF HVSHFLDOO\ FODVV IRUFHV 7KLV WUDS RWKHUZLVH NQRZQ DV µPHWKRGRORJLFDO
LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶ RU LQ 0DU[LVW SDUODQFH µERXUJHRLV IHWLVKLVP¶ Ls one, after all, that 
XQGLG,PPDQXHO:DOOHUVWHLQ¶VZRUOG-systems theory in the early 1990s. But the retreat of 
WST within Marxism came at a price ± namely the subsequent trumping of domestic 
class forces and the ontological downgrading of the international as a significant causal 
factor of world politics. So it is no small accomplishment that Anievas has developed an 
argument and approach which treats the articulation of internal and external causal forces 
in a fluid, seamless and effortless way; so much so that it all appears as entirely second 
nature for him. In this way, too, with respect to the wider IR literature, Anievas succeeds 
in taking us beyond the sterile binary of extant theories that focus either on the µSULPDF\
of innenpolitik¶RUWKHµSULPDFy of aussenpolitk¶ 
 The ERRNDOVREULQJVWROLIHDVHULHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVSDWLDOµYHFWRUV¶± the North-
South, the Atlantic and the West-East ± ZKLFKDUHDFWLYDWHGE\WKHHPSKDVLVRQµXQHYHQ
GHYHORSPHQW¶ ZKLOH WKH µFRPELQDWLRQ¶ DVSHFW WKDW SURFHHGV VXEVequently enables an 
extremely sophisticated treatment of social development, with societies re-appearing 
more properly as amalgams or hybridised entities; a manoeuvre that is simultaneously a 
key property of non-Eurocentrism, as I explain later.  
 Last, but by no means the least, the old spectre of economic reductionism which 
haunts the minds of many a Marxist, is something that Anievas manages, for the most 
part, to exorcise. Whether he has succeeded in exorcising this spectre altogether 
ultimately matters less to me than the point that his book is about as good as it gets in 
dispelling economic reductionism within Marxist IR theory. His treatment of the role of 
ideology, of the relationship between the state and capital and of the role of geopolitics 
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and international capitalism is a highly impressive achievement for any theory, let alone a 
Marxist one, and provides a breath of fresh ontological air. Indeed, in the context of 
NTIR, it goes further than the heroic efforts made by Alex Callinicos (2007), whose New 
Trotskyist article was the subject of a Cambridge Review of International Affairs forum, 
in which my own response critiqued his self-proclaimed non-reductionist ontology 
(Hobson 2007 and 2010). Indeed, in my view Anievas has taken the original pioneering 
anti-reductionist insights that were trail-blazed by Louis Althusser (1969) and Nicos 
Poulantzas (1973) to a much higher level of importance and significance. The only fly in 
WKHRLQWPHQW , IHHO OLHVZLWK$QLHYDV¶VWUHDWPHQWRI+LWOHU¶VUDFLVPZKLFh I shall deal 
with in my discussion of non-Eurocentrism later on. Overall, given that this non-
reductionist objective is clearly very important to Anievas, he might well anticipate that 
my article will interrogate this issue given that he consistently engages my earlier 
critiques of Marxist reductionism and, not least, because this was the thrust of my 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWK$OH[&DOOLQLFRV¶V17,5DUWLFOH 
 %XW ZLWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI KLV WUHDWPHQW RI +LWOHU¶V UDFLVP , IHHO WKDW D IXOO
interrogation of AnievaV¶V HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK QRQ-reductionism is mostly redundant for 
two reasons: first, because of his largely exceptional efforts in refuting this charge and 
second, because I now feel that Marxists have generally become rather too hung up with 
this issue. I feel pretty safe in declaring that probably no non-Marxist conventional IR 
theorist worries about this issue given that neorealists, constructivists and liberals all 
produce highly reductionist ontological accounts, with very few even feeling the need to 
redrHVV WKLVSUREOHP ,KDYHD WKHRU\DV WRZK\ WKLV LV WKHFDVHEXW ,VKDQ¶WZD\OD\ WKH
reader with such musings. In any case, the argument that states act ultimately in the 
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interests of the general bourgeoisie and that modern world politics is in some way shaped 
by capitalism remain extremely important insights that render Marxist IR such a powerful 
theory. So why shy away from it simply because some critics use it as a means of 
tormenting Marxist theory not least by tarnishing it as quasi-Stalinist? I fear, therefore, 
that Anievas will be disappointed by my decision not to interrogate this issue though 
equally I hope that he will not be disappointed by my preference to interrogate his non-
Eurocentric credentials, given that he has certainly made a bolder attempt at going 
beyond Eurocentrism than have the vast majority of IR theorists.  
 
«2QHVPDOOVWHSIRUQRQ-Eurocentrism (1): World War I and the elision of Eastern 
agency 
2QH RI WKH WKHPHV RI WKLV ERRN LV WR UHVWRUH ZKDW $QLHYDV FDOOV µWKH ORVW KLVWRU\ DQG
tKHRU\RI,5¶7KXVKHFODLPV 
 
[f]oregrounding the ineluctably intertwined and co-constitutive nature of imperial 
rivalries, social revolutions, and anti-colonial struggles evident to policymakers 
during the decades of crisis but subsequently lost in academic analyses, the study 
seeks to demonstrate how standard interpretations and assumptions about the period 
have been incomplete and often mistaken (Anievas 2014: 2). 
 
Such a lost theory and history that Anievas clearly wants to restore involves the inclusion 
of processes that are specific not just to Marxism but also to non-Eurocentrism. So the 
key question is: how successful has he been in restoring this lost account? My analysis 
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will go through each of the empirical chapters (3 through 6) in turn selecting only those 
discussions that are brought into focus by my non-Eurocentric lens. My basic claim is 
that while Anievas has indeed carved out a fruitful and promising space for a non-
(XURFHQWULFDQDO\VLVRIWKH7KLUW\<HDUV¶&ULVLVQHYHUWKHOHVVLQWKHODst instance he fails 
to fully deliver on it. For what ultimately is missing is the inclusion of Eastern agency. 
Thus while non-Western spaces and vistas are certainly opened up nevertheless they are 
treated as passive backdrops to the real theatre of agency ± that of the European arena. 
$FFRUGLQJO\ , ZDQW WR DUJXH WKDW LW LV WKH µORVW global history and theory of Eastern 
DJHQF\¶LQ$QLHYDV¶DFFRXQWQRWWRPHQWLRQWKRVHDGYDQFHGE\ULYDOWKHRULHVWKDWQHHGV
to be restored. I shall begin with Chapter 3 ± the first empirical case study ± which looks 
at the uneven and combined developmental origins of WWI.  
 From my non-Eurocentric perspective the framework articulated right at the 
outset of Chapter 3 for rethinking the origins of WWI looks extremely promising. For 
here Anievas sets out to examine three spatial vectors; first, a West-East plane of 
unevenness which looks at the successive phases of industrialization mainly within 
Europe but also beyond; second, a transatlantic vector that interlinks North America 
with Europe in general and the British Empire in particular; and third, a North-South 
vector/constellation interlinking and differentiating the multi-ethnic empires from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the Asia Pacific (especially India and China) into a 
dynamic of asymmetrical interdependency with the capital-industrial powers. 
 In the second section of this chapter Anievas considers the role of the Ottoman 
Empire in the causes of WWI and focuses specifically on Ottoman decline. Caught in 
the headlights of the European juggernaut, with its vastly superior European economic 
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and military power, the Ottoman Empire was unable to respond in an effective way, 
ZLWK WKH HQVXLQJ GLVLQWHJUDWLRQ SKDVH H[KLELWLQJ WKH SUREOHP RI µEORFNHG
GHYHORSPHQW¶7KHFULWLFDOSDUW of the argument concerns the claim that following the 
coming to power of the Young Turks in 1908 and the rise of Turkish nationalism the 
Ottoman Empire became embroiled in the Balkans War, which constituted a direct 
prelude to August 1914. Moreover, he claims that the Empire then came to react back 
upon Europe in causally significant ways. Upon this claim rests a great deal so far as a 
non-Eurocentric perspective that emphasises the role of Eastern agency is concerned. 
How does he execute this? 
 Essentially the claim is that the retreat of the declining Ottoman Empire 
FUHDWHG D YDFXXP LQWR ZKLFK YDULRXV (XURSHDQ SRZHUV PRYHG 7KXV 7XUNH\¶V
withdrawal from Europe created a space for the outward expansion of the aggressive 
Magyar nobility of the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary, which now came to be a 
crucial player in Central Eastern Europe. And following the 1878 Berlin Conference, 
Austria-Hungary came to govern over the provinces inhabited by Croatians, Serbians 
and Muslims. Moreover, as Anievas put it:  
 
$IXUWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKH+DEVEXUJ¶VHDVWZDUGGULYHZDVWKHFRQFOXVLRQRIWKH
Dual Alliance of 1879 contributing to closer Franco-Russian relations. Though 
originally conceived as a defensive strategy by Bismarck, over time the Alliance 
turned in to yet another factor undermining international order (Anievas 2014: 93). 
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7KH +XQJDULDQ QRELOLW\¶V DJJUHVVLYH SROLF\ RI 0DJ\DUL]DWLRQ SRLVRQHG $XVWULD-
+XQJDU\¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKLWVVRXWKHUQQHLJKERXUVZKLFKDOVRIHGLQWRWKHFDXVHVRI::,
But the problem with the role envisaged of the Ottoman Empire as a causal factor in 
WWI concerns the point that it is essentially conceived of as a passive arena, with the 
FRXQWU\¶VUHWUHDWIURP(XURSHIHHGLQJLQWRWKHDOO-important actions, as well as changes in 
the balance of power, within what constitutes the real WKHDWUH RI DJHQF\ LQ $QLHYDV¶V
narrative ± i.e., Europe. But what of India and China that he also considers? 
 In the discussion of India and China we encounter the very same Eurocentric 
mantra or trope that envelops the discussion of the Ottoman Empire. Once again, the 
industrialization of Europe opened up a huge power gap between the ancient empires of 
China and India. And here, the absolute decline of the Qing Dynasty and the slow 
collapse of colonized India helped to restructure the direction and dynamics of inter-
imperial rivalries between the European great powers. The Chinese power vacuum 
sucked Russia in and thereby changed the direction of Russian imperialism. That is, this, 
albeit unintentionally, caused a deflection of Russian economic expansionism into 
Manchuria that in turn effected a partial alleviation of European rivalries in the Balkans 
and the Ottoman Empire. This served simultaneously to relieve the tensions between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia and enabled an entente in 1897 to secure the Balkan status 
quo, while also enabling a kind of ultra-imperialist moment of European great power 
cooperation through its collective intervention in the Boxer Rebellion. And finally, the 
decline of the Qing effectively sucked Russia into war with Japan over Manchuria that 
OHG WR5XVVLD¶VKXPLOLDWLQJGHIHDWZKLFK LQ WXUQ OHGRQWR WKH5XVVLDQ UHYROXWLRQ
while simultaneously effecting a westward shift of Russian foreign policy. Accordingly, 
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KHFRQFOXGHVµWKHGLVLQWHgrating Qing Dynasty effected a dramatic reconfiguration of the 
(XURSHDQEDODQFHRISRZHU¶ $QLHYDVJLYHQ WKDW WKHP\WKRI5XVVLDQSRZHU
was now revealed to all.  
 Anievas concludes from this undoubtedly interesting and insightful discussion 
that WKH µ$VLDQ ³SHULSKHU\´ RI WKH 1RUWK-South vector constitutes an important if 
overlooked, factor unsettling the international system in the immediate post-ZDU \HDUV¶
(Anievas 2014: 96). Though I do not wish to denigrate what has been included here, 
nevertheless it only goes half-way to meeting my non-Eurocentric criteria. For the search 
IRUWKHµORVWJOREDOKLVWRU\RI(DVWHUQDJHQF\¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKLVDUJXPHQWUHPDLQVDQ
elusive quest since it is the actions of the European great powers that remain central to 
$QLHYDV¶V QDUUDWLYH ZLWK WKH GHFOLQH RI &KLQD ,QGLD DQG WKH 2WWRPDQ (PSLUH
constituting, in effect, passive backdrops to the headlining story of European agency.2 
Moreover, the rest of the discussion of the North-South vector reconvenes the analysis 
already considered, thereby reinforcing my conclusion.  
 
One small step for non-Eurocentrism (2): Recovering Eastern agency in the inter-
war era and beyond 
Turning now to Chapter 4, Anievas develops a fascinating discussion of Wilsonian 
diplomacy as it impacted the goings on at Versailles in 1919. I share entirely in his 
VXUSULVHFRQFHUQLQJ:RRGURZ:LOVRQ¶VWKRXJKWSROLFLHVDQGDFWLRQVLQVRIDUDVWKH\KDYH
conventionally been understood within IR as embodying a liberal internationalist politics 
                                                 
2
 For excellent discussions of war in the context of Eastern agency see Barkawi (2006); 
Laffey and Barkawi (2006). 
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that accords centrality to self-determination and anti-imperialism. Anievas clearly refutes 
this by insisting that Wilson was in fact a racist who was concerned to maintain Western 
imperialism in the world. With this I am in full agreement and I have developed just such 
an argument elsewhere (Hobson 2012: 165±75). But the problem I find here is not so 
much with that which Anievas has said but with that which he has omitted or understated.  
 7KH PDMRU WKUXVW RI $QLHYDV¶V UH-reading of Wilson is undeniably important, 
bringing to light his deep concerns and anxieties about the rise of communism in 
Bolshevik Russia in particular. This is an important corrective, though it has also been 
marvellously brought to life by Michael Hunt (1987: ch. 4). I guess that it should come as 
no surprise to learn that such a focus would be alighted upon by a Marxist! But, I argue, 
WKHUH LV DOVRDYLWDOO\ LPSRUWDQW µORVWJOREDO WKHRU\RI(DVWHUQDJHQF\¶DORQJVLGHD µORVW
JOREDOKLVWRU\DQGKLVWRULRJUDSK\RI,5¶WKDWQHHGVWREHUHFRYHUHGhere. Of what do these 
comprise? 
 7KHµORVWJOREDOKLVWRU\DQGKLVWRULRJUDSK\RI ,5¶ LVRQHZKLFKSODFHVHPSKDVLV
partly on the pre-1919 world of international theory,3 while also noting how 1919 was 
indeed significant but not simply for the reasons that are conventionally accorded it. 
Standard IR historiography reifies 1919 as the birth-year of the discipline and believes 
that it was girded from the outset by the desire to exorcise the spectre of warfare from the 
international system following the recent carnage of WWI.4 We could say that Anievas 
has provided an alternative way of thinking about 1919: that it was important because it 
                                                 
3
 See especially Schmidt (1998); Knutsen (2008); Vitalis (2005, 2010, 2016); Hobson 
(2012: chs. 2±7 and esp. chs. 6±7).  
4
 A claim that finds its original formulation in Carr (1946/1981). 
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furnished IR with the desire to eradicate the Bolshevik threat from the international 
system. However, 1919 also witnessed the first phase not simply of the Cold War 
between the USA and USSR, as Anievas deftly reveals, but also the explosion onto the 
world stage of an anti-colonialist surge that culminated in the era of decolonization 
following WWII. Moreover, this post-1919 turn did not spring up magically from 
nowhere but had been gestating ever since Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1896 and suffered a 
GHIHDWLQWKH%DWWOHRI$GZDDWWKHKDQGVRIWKHµLQIHULRU¶QRQ-white races; an event that 
Anievas also singles out but for the inverse reason to mine insofar as he deems its 
significance only in terms of the ramifications this had for the European balance of 
power.5 ,Q DGGLWLRQ 5XVVLD¶V GHIHDW DW WKH KDQGV RI WKH µ<HOORZ -DSDQHVH¶ ZDV
particularly important not simply for the unintended consequences that this had for 
changes in the European balance of power as Anievas assumes, but more for the massive 
psychological boost that it gave to the nascent anti-colonial nationalist movements 
(Aydin 2007: ch. 4), as well as for the massive shock that it imposed on many Western 
minds. Indeed, this was an event that rattled the very self-confidence of the white race. 
Probably no one made more of this than the American arch-Eugenicist, T. Lothrop 
Stoddard, who eulogised the Russian defeat in 1905 accordingly: 
  
[m]ost far-seeing white men recognized [the Japanese victory] as an omen of evil 
import for their race-IXWXUH«>7KH-DSDQHVHYLFWRU\ZDV@PRPHQWRXV«IRUZKDWLW
                                                 
5
 The irony here is that Anievas could easily have narrated this event in non-Eurocentric 
terms had he argued that Eastern agency led to the defeat of Italy, which then reacted 
back to thereby re-channel the direction of intra-European international politics. 
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revealed. The legend of white invincibility was shattered, the veil of prestige that 
GUDSHGZKLWHFLYLOL]DWLRQZDVWRUQDVLGHDQGWKHZKLWHZRUOG¶VPDQLIROGLOOVZHUH
laid bare for candid examination (Stoddard 1920: 171, 154, also 12, 21). 
 
Moreover, this fear of the non-white revolt against Western hegemony was a signature 
tune of inter-war liberal international theory, as I have explained elsewhere (Hobson 
2012: ch. 7), the upshot of which is my claim that 1919 was a significant, though not an 
originary, moment of the discipline of IR and that it was so in no insignificant part 
because of the threat that the East now posed to Western imperial hegemony and white 
racial supremacy in world politics. 
 7KXVPXFKPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\ZKHWKHU%ROVKHYLVPZDVYLHZHGLQ/RUG0LOQHU¶V
WHUPVDV µWKHJUHDWHVWGDQJHURI WKHFLYLOL]HGZRUOG¶DV$QLHvas insists, is a moot point 
given that many Westerners, whether they be IR scholars such as Alfred Zimmern and 
Gilbert Murray or political representatives at Versailles such as Woodrow Wilson, Jan 
6PXWV%LOO\+XJKHVDQG/RUG5REHUW&HFLOYLHZHG WKH µ(DVtern (anti-FRORQLDO WKUHDW¶
that emerged with a vengeance in 1919 as a collosal challenge to Western hegemony and 
white racial supremacy (Hobson 2012: ch. 7). More likely, though, the Bolshevik and 
(DVWHUQ µSHULOV¶FRQVWLWXWHG WKHSDUDPRXQW twin-threats that exercised Western minds in 
the inter-war era and indeed beyond. For the twin-issues of revolutionary class praxis and 
white racial supremacy were linked in the minds of many racists, especially Eugenicists. 
For them a key danger to white racial vitality was the threat posed not simply by the non-
ZKLWH EDUEDULF UDFHV EXW DOVR E\ WKH µHQHP\ ZLWKLQ¶ ± the white working class. Indeed 
µZKLWH UDFLDOYLWDOLW\¶ZDVDHXSKHPLVPIRUZKLWHelite vitality such that the survival of 
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the white race lay in the hands of the superior white elite which comprised the white 
µQHR-DULVWRFUDW¶ DVRSSRVHG WR WKHZKLWHZRUNLQJFODVV µXQGHU-PDQ¶ 6WRGGDUGRU
WKHZKLWHµVXE-PDQ¶)UHHPDQ6 This is significant because the issues of race and 
class entwine and, as such, they underpinned the Eugenicist fear of the proletarian threat 
WKDW%ROVKHYLVPDOOHJHGO\SRVHGIRUZKLWHUDFLDOVXSUHPDF\7RZLW/RWKURS6WRGGDUG¶V
proclamation that 
 
%ROVKHYLVP«UHYHDOVLWVHOIDVWKHDUFK-enemy of civilization and the [white] race. 
Bolshevism is the renegade, the traitor within the gates, who would betray the 
[white] citadel, degrade the very fibre of our being, and ultimately hurl a 
rebarbarized, racially impoverished world into the most debased and hopeless of 
PRQJUHOL]DWLRQV«7KHUHIRUH, Bolshevism must be crushed out with iron heels, no 
matter what the cost (Stoddard 1920: 221). 
 
And for many Westerners the obvious link here lay in the point that it was the Bolsheviks 
who called for anti-colonial self-determination (rather than Wilson, since for him, self-
determination turned out to apply only for Eastern European peoples, as Anievas also 
points out).  
 $WWKLVSRLQWP\FULWLTXHPRUSKVLQWRUHFRYHULQJµWKHORVWJOREDOWKHRU\RI(DVWHUQ
DJHQF\¶ JLYHQ P\ SHUFHSWLRQ RI LWV RPLVVLRQ ZLWKLQ $QLHYDV¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH
development of world politics in the inter-war era. At the outset it is noteworthy that the 
                                                 
6
 Significantly, Freeman sees in the British sub-man a lowlier figure than the Negro 
(Freeman 1921: 249±252). 
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Eastern revolt against empire exhibited a wide variety of forms. It witnessed, for 
example, the resistance actions of the May Fourth movement in China, the March First 
movement in Korea, the Destour Party in Tunisia and, not least, the Indonesian 
Nationalist Movement. Added to this was a string of rebellions against empire, the most 
famous of which constituted the Amritsar rebellion against the repressive Rowlatt Acts, 
which saw nearly 400 Indians killed by British guns and a further 1,000 wounded. Also 
important were the demands made by returning Black African-Americans for real 
democracy in the United States that in turn prompted the Ku Klux Klan, which had been 
revitalised during the war, to go on the rampage in America. These events received major 
negative press coverage around the world and were seized upon by the Russians and 
Japanese in their efforts to tarnish US democracy as a sham. Indeed, the cause of 
everyday Western racist behaviour became a major discursive fault-line of the Cold War, 
certainly in its 1947 to 1965 phase, wherein the Soviets constantly chastised the USA for 
the racist repression of its own Negro population; a discursive weapon that was wielded 
to great effect (Füredi 1998). 
 My point here is that while Anievas recognises some of this when discussing 
Wilsonian diplomacy, my problem is that he understates the issue of Eastern resistance. 
0RUHRYHU $QLHYDV¶V VFULSW RI Zorld politics as it unfolds in the inter-war years in 
Chapters 5 and 6 pays no attention to the rise of the anti-colonial nationalist movements. 
It is as if their presence in world politics had all but disappeared. Instead the vast majority 
of the narrative focuses on intra-European and intra-Western developments, which are 
treated as almost entirely devoid of influence by the non-Western world. This is 
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VXUSULVLQJ EHFDXVH WKHLU LQFOXVLRQ ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ ILW LQWR $QLHYDV¶V WKHRUHWLFDO
architecture ± specifically via the North-South vector. 
 It is accordingly at this juncture where we encounter the unevenness of the 
treatment that the North-South vector receives in the book. For while it is clearly present 
in his analysis of the causes of WWI it is conspicuous for its absence in his discussion of 
the causes of WWII. This, once again, returns us to the Eurocentric problem whereby the 
European arena is treated as the real theatre of agency. This is perplexing because Japan 
ZDVDIRUPDWLYHµDFWRU¶LQ::,,DQGQRW least, because its invasion of Pearl Harbor was 
a key factor that brought the United States into the war and thereby changed its dynamic 
altogether. Moreover, while Europeans tend to equate WWII with Nazi Germany, many 
peoples around the world equate it with Japanese militarism. And as even Niall Ferguson 
(2009) argues ± KDUGO\WKHZRUOG¶VPRVWZHOONQRZQQRQ-Eurocentric ± WWII arguably 
began with the war between China and Japan in 1937. In other words, it is possibly the 
case that the North-South vector is even more important in the context of the causes of 
WWII than it was vis-à-YLV::,,WVRPLVVLRQIURP$QLHYDV¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHFDXVHVRI
WWII, then, is doubly perplexing given that it could be such a fruitful area of analysis 
both for a non-Eurocentric approach on the one hand and as a means to flesh out his 
important conceptual analysis of the North-South vector in the development of world 
politics on the other. 
 7KHUHLVRQHFOHDUH[FHSWLRQKHUHKRZHYHUWKDWSURYHV$QLHYDV¶VUXOHRIWUHDWLQJ
European actors as the agents of world politics. For Anievas certainly brings the issue of 
European imperialism into the foreground throughout the book. This is certainly a vital 
corrective to liberal Eurocentric analyses of world politics and it is no less an important 
 19 
ingredient for any non-Eurocentric analysis. But the key problem ± that which makes his 
discussion of imperialism the exception that proves his quasi-Eurocentric rule ± is that an 
approach which focuses almost exclusively on the actions of the Western imperial great 
powers at the expense of the role of Eastern agency returns us back into the Eurocentric 
cul-de-sac. For the reification of Western agency is the very hallmark of Eurocentrism, 
whether it takes the form of a critical Marxist approach or one of a more consensual 
liberal approach. 
 
 
 
One small step forward for non-Eurocentrism, one step backwards for non-
reductionism? 
We also encounter an uneven intellectual treatment of two key figures who feature 
prominently in the book ± Adolf Hitler and Woodrow Wilson. For while Anievas 
GLVFXVVHV :LOVRQ¶V UDFLVP LQ &KDSWHU  WR JRRG HIIHFW QHYHUWKHOHVV +LWOHU¶V UDFLVP
receives far less consideration in Chapter 5. Moreover, I want to argue that the discussion 
RI +LWOHU¶V UDFLVP VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ RIIHQGV $QLHYDV¶V QRQ-reductionist- and non-
Eurocentric-FUHGHQWLDOV 7KXV WKURXJKRXW WKLV FKDSWHU LW DSSHDUV WKDW +LWOHU¶V UDFLVP LV
largely epiphenomenal to broader social and economic interests, to wit his summary 
found on page 42: µThe Nazi reJLPH¶VDJJUHVVLYHH[SDQVLRQLVP³can thus be rationalized 
as an intelligible response to the tensions stirred up by the uneven development of global 
capitDOLVP´¶ (Anievas 2014: 168).  
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 A further problem emerges from his reference to the well-known claims made by 
Hannah Arendt and Sven Lindqvist: 
 
[A]s Hannah Arendt observed, this long history of European colonial plunder, 
conquest and genocide was the direct forbearer to the Holocaust« >$QG DV
Lindqvist shows] the Holocaust was unique ± in Europe. But the history of Western 
expansion in other parts of the world shows many examples of total extermination 
of whole peoples (Anievas 2014: 168).  
 
,QGUDZLQJIURP/LQGTYLVW¶V Exterminate All the Brutes (2002), Anievas is by no means 
alone when trying to understand the relationship of scientific racism to imperialism. But 
the notion that nineteenth-century scientific racism followed a teleological path which 
steamed towards the terminus of Auschwitz is deeply problematic. For scientific racism 
was far more multivalent than this common misconception recognises. In particular, the 
German Geopolitik school, which included Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer and Richard 
Hennig, worked within an environmental-based Lamarckian racist approach which 
differed in certain fundamental respects to HitlHU¶V JHQHWLF-determinist, anti-Semitic 
(XJHQLFV&ULWLFDOO\+LWOHU¶VDQWL-Semitic Eugenics required the physical destruction of 
WKH -HZV DV ZHOO DV ZKDW WXUQHG RXW WR EH DERXW  µSK\VLFDOO\ GHIHFWLYH $U\DQ¶
Germans ZKRZHUHµPHUFLIXOO\FXOOHG¶LQWKe Nazi Euthanasia Program that went by the 
codename, Aktion T4.
7
 No such plan could have been conceived either by the Lamarckian 
                                                 
7
 Taken from the street address of the (XWKDQDVLD3URJUDP¶s coordinating office in Berlin 
± Tiergartenstrasse 4. 
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Geopolitikers or by many other scientific racist imperialists who developed non-
genocidal conceptions of imperialism such as Paul Reinsch, Alleyne Ireland, Raymond 
Leslie Buell and Woodrow Wilson, let alone the many anti-imperialist scientific racists 
who include Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner and David Starr Jordan (in his 
pre-1919 writings) (see Hobson 2012: ch. 4). 
 Moreover, it is here where the economic-UHGXFWLRQLVWWUHDWPHQWRI+LWOHU¶VUDFLVP
intersects with the problem of representing racist-imperialism in monolithic terms. While 
HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOIDFWRUVDUHXQGRXEWHGO\LPSRUWDQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ+LWOHU¶VYLHZV
on imperialism, it would be problematic to treat these as ontologically fundamental. For 
DV,MXVWQRWHGLWZDVDIXQGDPHQWDODVSHFWRI+LWOHU¶V(XJHQLFLVWGLVFRXUVHWKDWWKHµGLUW\
-HZ¶DVZHOODVWKHµGHIHFWLYH¶$U\DQHOHPHQWVVKRXOGEHHUDGLFDWHGIURm Germany and 
Europe in order to prevent the infection of the Aryan race through miscegenation that 
would lead to its subsequent degeneration and demise. Surely, such a sensitivity to the 
partial autonomy of discourse constitutes a vital component of a non-reductionist, not to 
mention a non-Eurocentric, approach? For, after all, the Jews remain to this day far more 
sensitive to the issue of racist anti-Semitism than they do the excesses of global 
capitalism, the linkages between these two social processes notwithstanding. All in all, 
WKHQLWZRXOGEHDJUHDWVKDPHLILQDGPLUDEO\µEULQJLQJLQWKHORVWKLVWRU\RIFODVVDQG
FDSLWDOLVP¶ LQWR WKH FDXVHV RI WKH 7KLUW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV $QLHYDV VKRXOG WKURZ RXW WKH
racist-discursive baby with the bourgeois bathwater and thereby lose sight of the lost 
history of race and racism within world politics. 
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Conclusion: Is Marxist Eurofetishism an inevitable consequence of Trotskyist IR 
theory?  
(OVHZKHUH,KDYHGLVFXVVHGWKHSUREOHPRIZKDWFDQEHFDOOHGµ(XURIHWLVKLVP¶ZKich, I 
argue, infects much of Marxist IR (Hobson 2012: ch. 10). What, then, is Eurofetishism? 
.DUO 0DU[¶V V\VWHP RI SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ ZDV IRXQGHG RQ WKH FULWLTXH RI µERXUJHRLV
IHWLVKLVP¶ ± the tendency of non-Marxists to treat non-class factors as having an 
ontological power in their own right, divorced from the bedrock of the social relations of 
production that generate WKHP)RUH[DPSOHµFRPPRGLW\IHWLVKLVP¶RFFXUVZKHQOLEHUDO
SROLWLFDOHFRQRPLVWVDVVXPHWKDWDFRPPRGLW\¶VYDOXHLVLQWULQVLFWRLWYLDWhe demand that 
it engenders within the market place. Rather, for Marx, a commodity is not an 
autonomous entity because its value is derived from the average number of hours of 
labour-SRZHU WKDW DUH H[SHQGHG DQG H[SORLWHG LQ SURGXFLQJ LW ,Q WKLV ZD\ 0DU[¶s 
method tunnels down beneath the realm of the everyday appearance of (autonomous) 
things in order to reveal the underlying social relations of production that produce them, 
thereby redirecting focus towards the class struggle within the mode of production (e.g., 
Marx 1867/1954, 366, 483, 567±70; Marx 1867/1959, 45±8, 168, 392±99, 827, 829±31). 
Above all, because bourgeois fetishism exorcises the ontological primacy of class 
struggle so the motor of development that underpins the mode of production is banished, 
thereby negating, or rendering impossible, its overthrow through revolution. Accordingly, 
bourgeois fetishism has the effect of eternalising capitalism while at the same time 
(re)presenting it as entirely natural and harmonious. By analogy, I argue that 
Eurofetishism occurs when the analyst reifies the West into a fetish by ascribing it with 
too much agency, thereby failing to recognise the co-constitutive relations of civilizations 
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that partly make and re-make the West as well as world politics. Thus the elision of 
Eastern agency and co-constitutive inter-civilizational struggles has the effect of 
fetishising the West and thereby naturalising and eternalising Western power/domination 
in world politics.  
7KHTXHVWLRQWKHQLVGRHV$QLHYDV¶VDQDO\VLVVXffer from Eurofetishism and is it, 
more generally, an inevitable product of Trotskyism? Certainly Anievas sets out to bring 
in various non-Eurocentric properties to his analysis. But the omission of Eastern agency 
comprises the major deficit that in turn lHDGV$QLHYDV¶VDQDO\VLVDOEHLWXQZLWWLQJO\EDFN
into the trap of Eurofetishism and hence the eternalisation and naturalisation of Western 
SRZHU LQ WKH ZRUOG ,¶P VXUH WKDW WKLV LV D WUDS WKDW $QLHYDV ZRXOG ZDQW VLQFHUHO\ WR
avoid. But the question now becomes: is this an inevitable product of his NTIR? To 
answer this I shall discuss Trotsky before turning back to Anievas. 
 My own view on Trotsky is that of all the classical Marxists his oeuvre held out 
the most potential for a non-Eurocentric analysis of world politics. In this regard I can 
WKLQN RI QR EHWWHU H[DPSOH WKDQ 7URWVN\¶V FODLP FLWHG E\ $QLHYDV ZKLFK VHUYHV WR
WUDQVFHQG0DU[¶V(XURFHQWULFHYROXWLRQDU\WKHRU\WRZLW 
 
it was clear by the early 20
th
 century that the development of the more advanced 
VRFLHWLHVZHUHQRWGHVWLQHGWRVKRZWKHOHVVGHYHORSHGµWKHLPDJHRILWVRZQIXWXUH¶
[Marx],QWKLVVHQVHWKHFRXUVHRIKLVWRU\KDGSURYHQ0DU[PLVWDNHQµ(QJODQGLQ
her day revealed the future of France, considerably less of Germany, but not in the 
OHDVWRI5XVVLDDQGQRWRI,QGLD¶(Trotsky cited in Anievas 2014: 42). 
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7KLV VHPLQDO UHIXWDWLRQ RI 0DU[¶V IDPRXV FODLP JRHV WR WKH YHU\ KHDUW RI 7URWVN\¶V
WKHRUHWLFDO DUVHQDO )RU WKLV FODLP LV JHQHUDWHG IURP KLV NH\ FRQFHSW RI µXQHYHQ DQG
combined developPHQW¶ DV ZHOO DV WKDW RI µSHUPDQHQW UHYROXWLRQ¶ $V $QLHYDV VKRZV
clearly in Chapter 2, permanent revolution issues from the uneven nature of the 
international constitution of capitalism, whereby the Russian working class is able to 
telescope the supposed inevitable stagist sequence of development, from feudalism to 
capitalism and thence socialism, into a single uninterrupted stage. International capitalism 
issues various challenges to non-(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVQRWWKHOHDVWRIZKLFKLVWKHµZKLSRI
external nHFHVVLW\¶7KXVWKHVXSHULRUFDSLWDOLVW-cum-military power of European states in 
the context of a capitalist world order imposes the requirement of non-European states to 
adapt or perish. Uneven development, therefore, is the immediate backdrop to this. The 
VXEVHTXHQWDGDSWDWLRQSKDVHLQYROYHVDµEDFNZDUG¶FRXQWU\µFRPELQLQJ¶HOHPHQWVRIWKH
advanced capitalist states within its own social domestic order, thereby creating a 
FRPSOH[K\EULGDPDOJDP7KLVLVXVXDOO\WUHDWHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI7URWVN\¶VQRWLRQof the 
µSULYLOHJHRIEDFNZDUGQHVV¶LQZKLFKEDFNZDUGVRFLHWLHVFDQMXPSVWDJHVE\GUDZLQJRQ
the more advanced technologies ± military and economic ± that were pioneered in this 
FDVHE\WKH(XURSHDQVRFLHWLHV&HUWDLQO\WKLVZDVWKHWKUXVWRI7URWVN\¶V65) analysis 
of Russian industrialization. But this enabling face of the capitalist-cum-geopolitical 
international can also be negated by its constraining face, in which the backward society 
borrows the inventions of the advanced countries but in so doing effects a debasement of 
the borrower society. Either way, though, the key upshot of all this is the concept of 
µDPDOJDPDWLRQ¶ ZKHUH ERUURZHU VRFLHWLHV EHFRPH µK\EULGLVHG¶ DPDOJDPV FRPSULVLQJ
advanced and backward properties.  
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 As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, the recognition that societies are 
not purely self-generating and self-constituting monoliths but are hybrid amalgams is a 
fundamental property not just of Trotskyism but also of non-Eurocentrism and 
postcolonialism. There are several links here, though they require a further twist of the 
non-Eurocentric screw to grasp them. One such link comprises the postcolonial emphasis 
RQ WKH (DVWHUQ VWUDWHJ\ RI µPLPLFU\¶ ZKHUHE\ (DVWHUQ VRFLHWLHV FRS\ EXW DOVR VXEYHUW
Western civilizational ideas DQGLQWKHSURFHVVEHFRPHµDOPRVW WKHVDPHEXWQRWTXLWH¶
(Bhabha 1994: 122; see also Bilgin 2008). It is also important to note the rather obvious 
point that a non-Eurocentric approach must first of all conduct its analysis at the global 
level rather than that of the intra-European system ± where the latter tendency finds its 
H[SUHVVLRQ LQ $OH[DQGHU *HUVFKHQNURQ¶V  FODVVLF HFRQRPLF KLVWRU\ RI (XURSH
ZKLFK LWVHOI RZHV PXFK WR 7URWVN\¶V ZRUN HYHQ WKRXJK WKLV LQVSLUDWLRQ ZHQW
unacknowledged.8 NeverthHOHVV ZKLOH 7URWVN\¶V DQDO\VLV is applied to non-European 
states the problem is that the direction of analysis goes squarely from West to East. That 
is, Western states develop first and the Eastern states simply follow and emulate the 
superior European societies as best they can, albeit by plying a different path to that 
which was trail-blazed by the European countries. Put differently, this is precisely what 
-DPHV%ODXWRULJLQDOO\FDOOHGµGLIIXVLRQLVW(XURFHQWULFKLVWRU\¶ 
Thus while hybridity is significant in that it transcends the Eurocentric story of 
world development as one in which the Rest is remade in the image of the West, 
nevertheless in the absence of an account of Eastern agency whereby the Rest comes to 
                                                 
8
 )RUDQH[FHOOHQWFRPSDULVRQRI*HUVFKHQNURQ¶VWKHRU\ZLWK7URWVN\¶VVHH6HOZ\Q
(2011).  
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affect the development and indeed constitution of Western societies in manifold ways, so 
we necessarily find ourselves back in the Eurocentric cul-de-sac. The one pregnant 
H[FHSWLRQ WR WKLV OLHV ZLWK 7URWVN\¶V EHOLHI WKDW WKH 5HVW FDQ ILJKW EDFN E\ UHVLVWLQJ
Western capitalism through revolutionary Eastern agency, as well as with his claim that 
socialist revolution is more likely to occur first in the non-Western world than within 
Europe. Though certainly an important point it seems as though there are no other cues in 
7URWVN\¶VZRUNFRQFHrning Eastern agency in the terms that I have described it within this 
article.  
So is a non-Eurocentric analysis in the last instance a lost cause for NTIR? I do 
not believe so for there are clearly some NTIR scholars who are working precisely within 
a non-Eurocentric framework. In this context I have already mentioned various works 
(Matin 2007, 2012; Shilliam 2009), though I might, albeit modestly, add myself given 
that I advanced my non-Eurocentric approach to U&CD through a non-Marxist 
framework (Hobson 2011). And even outside of IR there have been significant 
Trotskyists such as C.L.R. James (1938/2001) and Marxists such as Eric Williams 
(1944), who have transcended Eurocentrism, not to mention a number of other neo-
Marxists (e.g., Wolf 1982; Amin 1989; Abu-Lughod 1989; Frank 1998). All of these 
works seek to subvert Eurocentrism by drawing on the broad canvass of historical 
sociology.  
If I may be indulgent for a moment, it is worth noting that in my own piece I 
FRQIURQWHG 7URWVN\¶V (XURFHQWULF DVVXPSWLons that industrialization was pioneered in 
England and that England can be treated as sui generis (Hobson 2011; see also Hobson 
2004: chs. 9±,GLGWKLVE\DUJXLQJWKDW(QJODQGZDVQRWWKHSLRQHHUEXWZDVDµODWH-
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GHYHORSHU¶ WKDW WULSSHG WKH LQGXVWULDO light-fantastic partly because it enjoyed the 
µSULYLOHJHRIEDFNZDUGQHVV¶7KDWLVWKURXJKWKHFRPELQDWLRQSURFHVVLWZDVDEOHWRGUDZ
on the many inventions that had been pioneered by the earlier developers ± the Middle 
East/Egypt, India and, above all, China ± in order to make the final breakthrough into 
modernity. In other words, the uneven and combined developmental process can run from 
East to West. Added to this were the many imperial sites of exploitation that England 
engaged throughout the world, with Black African slavery, Chinese and Indian 
indentured labour, together with the vast array of countries from which the English 
extracted crucial raw materials, all contributing to enable English industrialization. In this 
way, I was able to retrieve thH µORVW JOREDO KLVWRU\ DQG WKHRU\ RI GHYHORSPHQW(DVWHUQ
DJHQF\¶ WKHUHE\ HOHYDWLQJ WKH H[SHULHQFH RI RQH FRXQWU\ LQWR D WKRURXJKO\ global 
context.  
I mention my own analysis here because it works on a similar canvass to that 
which Anievas and his co-author Kerem 1LúDQFLR÷OX have developed in their excellent 
book on the rise of the West (Anievas and 1LúDQFLR÷OX 2015). Thus while Trotsky 
provided various cues for a non-Eurocentric approach but failed to properly deliver on 
them, nevertheless it is perfectly possible to deploy his well-known concepts of 
U&CD/amalgams in a genuinely global context in order to deliver NTIR to the promised 
non-Eurocentric intellectual land. While I do not believe that Anievas quite managed 
such a feat in the book under review here, I believe that he has undoubtedly succeeded in 
his most recent book (Anievas and 1LúDQFLR÷OX 2015)$OO LQDOO WKRXJKIRU$QLHYDV¶V
non-(XURFHQWULFHIIRUWV,VD\µWZRFKHHUVIRUCapital, the State and War¶DQGIRUWKHERRN
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in the round and as an original contribution both to NTIR and IR more generally, I say 
ZKROHKHDUWHGO\µWKUHHFKHHUV¶ 
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